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JUSTIFYING BAD DEALS 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan 
Abstract: In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that individual 
commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and traditional promises. Even take-
it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial deference from consumers—even when the terms are 
unenforceable, even when the assent is procedurally compromised, and even when the drafter is an 
impersonal commercial actor. Indeed, there is mounting evidence that people import the morality of 
promise into situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive. The 
purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for understanding what seems to be widespread 
acceptance of regulation via unread terms. I refer to this phenomenon as “term deference”—the 
finding that people defer to the term, even when the assent is perfunctory, and even when the term is 
unfair.  
The framework I propose is a motivated reasoning explanation: when it feels better to believe that 
contracts are fair and that assent is reliable, people are more likely to hold those beliefs. In order to 
predict when contractual fairness will be especially psychologically urgent, I draw on an extensive body 
of psychological literature on the preference for believing in a just world, or for being satisfied with 
the status quo. When a phenomenon or a system appears implacable and unavoidable, it is 
psychologically less stressful to believe that the system is good. “System justification” is a well-
documented psychological phenomenon that predicts when individuals will be motivated to hold 
beliefs that support the status quo, even when the status quo redounds to their own disadvantage. The 
two studies reported here manipulate the pressure to support the status quo—to believe that firms are 
reasonable and contract law is fair—by varying the term’s enforceability, its consequences, and its 
history. The findings show the predicted patterns, that increased psychological pressure to support 
the status quo increases beliefs that the status quo is good and fair. These results also align with the 
prediction that pressure to justify the status quo is not only a psychological state, but also a trait. That 
trait, highly associated with political conservatism, is reflected in the results suggesting a stronger 
motivation to justify the status quo among subjects who report that they are more politically 
conservative. The results here have implications not only for contract law, but also for how we 
understand self-interest in legal decision-making, and for the legal understandings of consent and 
compliance. 
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JUSTIFYING BAD DEALS 
 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan* 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The psychology of contract law is a young field, but it has recently amassed an impressive 
cluster of null results that might be described as “consumers not complaining about bad deals.” 
It is a longstanding challenge for researchers to systematically describe a fact in the world that 
mostly manifests as a puzzling absence (for Sherlock Holmes fans, a dog that does not bark), 
because it can be hard to pin down what is so compelling about something that does not happen. 
But in the last ten years, scholars have offered detailed accounts of consumer inaction, inaction 
that costs them real money, across the universe of consumer contracts. A number of high-
stakes examples come to mind. In 2009, in a crashing housing market, economists were 
perplexed to find that underwater homeowners, who could have saved hundreds of thousands 
of dollars by choosing foreclosure and walking away, kept paying down their inflated mortgages 
even as the lenders were being bailed out.1 In the decade since California has banned non-
compete clauses, employees with patently unenforceable non-competes in their employment 
contracts have nonetheless adhered to their terms and refused better job offers.2 And by their 
own account, thousands of everyday participants in routine contracting treat the terms of their 
unread take-it-or-leave-it boilerplate with the same deference as negotiated deals.3  
 
 
* Professor of Law & Psychology, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I am grateful to 
Jeffrey Rachlinski and participants in the George Mason University Law and Economics 
Experimental Research Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Many thanks to 
Michelle Wang (Penn Law ’21) for her excellent research assistance.  
1 See, e.g., John Krainer & Stephen LeRoy, Underwater Mortgages, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF 
SAN FRANCISCO ECONOMIC LETTERS (2010), 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter /2010/el2010-31.html (last visited 
August 9, 2019) (reviewing the statistics on strategic default in the mortgage context). 
2 Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott & Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force, UNIV. OF MICH. 
LAW & ECON. RESEARCH PAPER NO. 18-013 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2625714 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2625714 (estimating the statistical effect of non-compete 
clauses on employee mobility). 
3 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, The Perverse Consequences of Disclosing Standard Terms, 103 CORNELL L. 
REV. 117, 124–26 (2017) (reporting experimental studies of consumer responses to hidden 
terms). 
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These findings could be anomalous, or they could be rationalized, but they could also be taken 
seriously, as prima facie evidence of a behavioral phenomenon. This Article aims to describe this 
deference to burdensome terms as a phenomenon in its own right, and then to test the role of 
motivated cognition—i.e., wishful thinking—in the emerging moral psychology of consumer 
contracts.  
 
The motivated reasoning hypothesis grows from the informal observation that most people 
would prefer to be agents than pawns. It is also, however, a natural next step in the empirical 
literature. The last decade of research in the psychology of consumer contracting has identified 
two important patterns. The first is that people take promises seriously.4 This finding is easy 
for psychologists to explain, in the sense that it is an explicit value; many people can and do 
articulate that promise-keeping is a moral norm that they have internalized and hold dear.5 The 
second pattern is that people import the conventional morality of interpersonal promising into 
situations that might otherwise be described as predatory, exploitative, or coercive.6 That 
finding is less easy to explain, and the purpose of this Article is to propose a framework for 
understanding what seems to be widespread acceptance of regulation via unread terms. I 
describe this deference to terms as puzzling because it seems at odds with most people’s 
material self-interest. The literature suggests that people defer to the term as written, even when 
the assent is perfunctory, and even when the term is unfair. We ought to be surprised that 
people who are otherwise comparison shopping and discriminating on price are leaving value 
on the table.  
 
To be intentionally tendentious: in the United States, firms unilaterally draft private legislation, 
without oversight, and use American contract law to enforce their rules.7 Everyone does and 
everyone must agree to take-it-or-leave it deals in order to participate in American economic 
and social life.8 Taking no particular view about whether or not companies make good rules, 
and acknowledging that firms do not consistently choose the worst terms they can get away 
with,9 it is still true that terms are not closely regulated by the market or the government, and 
 
4 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 843, 
845–46 (2012) (reviewing the psychological correlates of promissory morality and contract 
morality). 
5 Id. at 846–51. 
6 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan supra note 3 at 164 (“When terms are memorialized and documents 
shared, they assume the mantle of contract-capital-C, with all of its moral and social baggage.”) 
7 See, e.g., Margaret Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE 
RULE OF LAW (Princeton University Press, 2012) (presenting a sweeping overview of the role 
of fine print in American economic life, and articulating its implications for legal legitimacy). 
8 Lior J. Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2027–29 
(2012). 
9 See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Competition and the Quality of Standard Form Contracts: The 
Case of Software License Agreements, 5 JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES 3, 447–475 (2008) 
(reporting equivocal findings on the effects of competition on burdensome terms). 
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are not “chosen” in any interesting sense of that word by the individuals subject to their 
constraints.10 So why is the assent analysis so sticky? Why do courts and consumers still talk 
about what consumers have agreed to?11 
 
The core hypothesis for this paper is that term deference is a motivated reasoning phenomenon. 
What this means is that when it feels better to believe that contracts are fair and that assent is 
reliable, people are at least marginally more likely to hold those beliefs. This itself is not 
controversial; self-serving biases are well-documented in the law and psychology literature.12 
What is novel, and counterintuitive, is the proposition that it might feel good for consumers 
themselves to believe that consumers should defer to their corporate counterparties. Usually 
“myside bias,”13 as it is sometimes called, favors the material benefit of the one making the 
judgment.14 So why would consumers themselves support hidden fees or fine-print arbitration 
clauses? The prediction is twofold. First, it is psychologically appealing to believe that overall 
the system functions.15 Consumers have very little actual control, and so it is appealing to 
believe in the social order. This is the just world hypothesis,16 or system justification theory.17 
The second is that there is something particular about believing that assent—or perhaps more 
correctly, consent—is meaningful. It is important to believe that when humans agree, that 
agreement is real.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, ProCD vs. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining, 
77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1185 (2010) (arguing that terms are so burdensome to read that they 
should not even be provided before purchase.)  
11 See, e.g., Robert Hillman, Rolling Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 743, 744 (2002) (describing 
the law as one of granular analysis of when precisely the terms are available for review by the 
consumer). 
12 See, e.g., George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, Self-
Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. OF LEG. STUD. 135 (1993) (showing the 
effects of motivated reasoning on good faith efforts to reason neutrally about fairness in a zero-
sum task). 
13 See, e.g., Jonathan Baron, Myside Bias in Thinking About Abortion, 1 Thinking & Reasoning 221 
(1995) (explaining myside bias as a “failure to think of arguments on the other side.”). 
14 Keith E. Stanovich, Richard F. West & Maggie E. Toplak, Myside Bias, Rational Thinking, and 
Intelligence, 22 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 4, 259–264 (2013). 
15 M. J. Lerner & D. T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process: Looking Back and 
Ahead, 85 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 5, 1030–1051 (1978) (describing the first generation of 
“just world bias” research in psychology). 
16 Id. 
17 See id. 
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I. THE TROPE OF THE FECKLESS CONSUMER: AN ILLUSTRATION 
 
The core fact of consumer contracting is that individuals are sometimes subject to bad terms.18 
One way to interpret this fact is that firms prey on unsuspecting consumers, who are powerless 
to help themselves.19 Another interpretation is that consumers have power that they are too 
lazy or short-sighted to exercise20—they are feckless, not powerless. 
 
A familiar window into the rhetoric of all’s-fair-in-love-and-contracts is the fable of the feckless 
consumer who did not read the fine print.21 If there is one thing that almost everyone (except 
contracts scholars) can agree on, it is that reading contracts is good. Even in academic literature, 
researchers have been preoccupied with increasing readership since pre-internet days. 22 
Readership, or failure to read, is also a perennial feature of popular contracts commentary.23 
Often articles exposing or criticizing bad contract terms are framed in terms of the foolish 
consumer who finds himself victim to the savvy firm. Take, for example, a recent op-ed in The 
Washington Post on the pitfalls of travel contracts: 
 
It’s no exaggeration to say that many, if not most, travel problems start with a failure 
to read the terms and conditions… [For example] cruise contracts say the staff may 
search your cabin for any reason at any time. The cruise line can also use your image 
for any purpose without compensation. 
 
Travel insurance policies are written in gibberish. Even if you think you understand 
what you’ve read, you might want to read it again.24 
 
Cruise ship employees with carte blanche search power is probably a term people both strongly 
dislike and fail to anticipate. In light of that, the rhetoric is telling. In the face of a stark 
 
18 See, e.g., Richard Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent, and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 
359 (1969) (articulating the purpose of the unconscionability doctrine in the protection of 
consumers). 
19 See, e.g., Daniel Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005) 
(describing the power differential in contract as a core feature of consumer protection). 
20 See, e.g., Shmuel Becher, Behavioral Science and Consumer Standard Form Contracts, 68 LA. L. REV. 
117 (2007) (reviewing a variety of consumer mistakes and their effects on form contracting). 
21 See, e.g., Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
917, 945 (1974) (“The nineteenth century departure from the equitable conception of contract 
is particularly obvious in the rapid adoption of the doctrine of caveat emptor.”) 
22 See, e.g., Griffith Garwood, Robert J. Hobbs, and Fred H. Miller, Consumer Disclosure in the 
1990s, 9 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 777 (1992) (arguing for increased readability in contracts). 
23 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3 (describing contract “ambivalence” in popular culture 
accounts). 
24 Christopher Elliott, Read the Fine Print Before You Travel, WASH. POST (July 3, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/travel/read-the-fine-print-before-you-
travel/2019/07/03/102a0342-977b-11e9-8d0a-5edd7e2025b1_story.html?noredirect=on. 
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consumer choice—accept unlimited search or do not go on your cruise—the article locates 
prime responsibility not with the firm that insisted on intrusive privacy terms, but with the 
consumer who did not read them. Indeed, the suggested remedy for what we might view as 
fine print overreach by the firms is to read the fine print more than once. Such a commitment to 
consumer prudence is not supported by either the evidence or by the underlying logic, which 
suggests the scolding tone is motivated by something other than accuracy. The belief that 
consumers ought to help themselves appears to be more deontological than consequentialist.    
 
That example is cherry-picked, but it is not isolated. Those who follow contracts in the national 
media may recall the 2015 multi-part investigative series in the New York Times.25 The series, a 
serious look at the ubiquity and equities of arbitration, nonetheless went by the subtitle, 
“Beware the Fine Print.”26 I drew five examples from the past two years of national news media 
of terms that were, by the lights of the articles themselves, egregious. The purpose is largely 
suggestive, to bring some specificity to a cultural narrative that most of us will find very familiar. 
 
A Non-Random Sample of Popular Rhetoric Around Bad Terms: 
 
 Class action waivers in consumer contracts: “The next time you open a 
bank account or sign up for a credit card, make sure you read the fine print.”27 
 Mandatory arbitration for workplace sexual harassment claims: “It’s easy 
to overlook practical tasks such as closely reading your employment contract. But that 
document may contain terms and conditions you should know about in advance...” 28 
 Disclaimer of liability for a moving company that auctioned off a family’s 
possessions instead of moving them from one residence to the other: “[I]t is 
important to read every word of a contract before accepting or signing it.” 29 
 
25 Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, 
N.Y. Times, October 31, 2015 (reporting on the effects of mandatory arbitration across a 
variety of contracts domains under the series sub-hed, “Beware the Fine Print”, available at 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html) 
26 Id. 
27 CNN, Ways You Sign Your Rights Away with Bank Accounts, CNN.com, October 26, 2017, 
available at https://www.wcpo.com/money/consumer/dont-waste-your-money/4-ways-can-
sign-away-rights-sign-bank-account-credit-card. 
28 Rebecca Koenig, What You Need to Know about Mandatory Arbitration, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REPORT (July 9, 2018), https://money.usnews.com/careers/company-
culture/articles/2018-07-09/what-you-need-to-know-about-mandatory-arbitration 
29  Diane Walker, What to Look Out for When Signing A Contract, NBC 12 (May 14, 2019), 
https://www.nbc12.com/2019/05/15/what-look-out-when-signing-contract/. 
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 Unenforceable non-Compete agreement: “Free tip from a lawyer: Always 
read the fine print. You’re welcome.” 30 
 Discontinued coverage for smoke damage in homeowners policies in a 
wildfire zone: “Although all changes must be disclosed, many homeowners may not 
pay attention or may not read the fine print. ‘People have to be very vigilant.’” 31 
 
These five terms are each serious enough and onerous enough to be subject to plausible legal 
challenge.32 Indeed, some of the terms reported were plainly impermissible at the time of the 
reporting; the purpose of covering non-compete clauses was explicitly to point out that the 
terms are not legally enforceable but nonetheless included in the contracts.33 In each case, the 
article, or even the title, frames the problem as consumer failure to read carefully, but in each 
case we should retort, “How would that help?!” 
 
The family whose possessions were sold off at auction by their moving company almost 
certainly would not have predicted that outcome from a bland waiver of liability. And how 
would reading a non-compete clause, which is not enforceable by the firm, be helpful to a new 
employee? Presumably that employee would be better off reading the Civil Code of California.34 
The individual job-seeker probably does not have the leverage to strike a mandatory arbitration 
clause, and likely has professional and financial needs that render such a clause low-priority.35 
Perhaps the most useful standard example is the class action waiver. There is simply no world 
where individual consumers make better market decisions by knowing whether a particular firm 
 
30 Mark Gabel, When Companies Make Workers Sign Illegal Non-Compete Agreements, MEDIUM (May 
21, 2017), https://medium.com/@gabel_law_firm/when-companies-make-workers-sign-
illegal-non-compete-agreements-4f158174d8e. 
31 David Lazarus, Column: How to Deal with An Insurer after Your Home Is Burned Down, L.A. TIMES 
(Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-california-fire-
insurance-20181112-story.html. 
32 See, e.g., Richard Spiedel, Unconscionability, Assent, and Consumer Protection 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 
359, 365-367 (1970) (reviewing state and federal approaches to term overreach).  
33 Gabel supra note 30 (“I suspect that these companies and their lawyers know exactly what 
they’re doing, because when we point out to them that their non-compete clause violates 
California law, they sometimes refuse to remove them. These companies apparently hope to 
intimidate the employee into working for the company for as long as the employer wants, under 
whatever terms the employer wants to impose, by causing the employee to fear violating the 
clause.”) 
34 California Business and Professions Code section 16600 provides that “except as provided 
in this chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful 
profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.” 
35 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory 
Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 6 UKMC L. Rev. 449 (1995) (arguing that 
employers, as repeat players, have incentives to attend to employment contracts more carefully 
than employees, who are one-shot players). 
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does or does not waive class actions.36 The probability of that term affecting any particular 
consumer is minute37, and indeed all the more trivial when the term is common across products 
and firms.38   
 
Overall, these cases are best understood as potential catalysts for political, rather than individual, 
action. As such, the focus on individual responsibility here is odd, given that consumers have 
minimal incentives and little power to improve their own outcomes39, whereas firms can swiftly 
and unilaterally choose to draft different terms. Whether or not it is efficient or right for them 
to do so is its own question, but in this Article, I start from the proposition that some terms 
are widely agreed to be burdensome, and then ask the question of why they are nonetheless 
acceptable. 
 
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I lays out the existing evidence that the law and 
psychology, respectively, of consumer contracting is highly deferential to drafters. Part II 
introduces the psychological theory of system justification, which posits that beliefs and 
preferences that justify the existing social and legal order are motivated—they are 
psychologically less dissonant and more appealing. This Part also draws the connections 
between the predictions of system justification theory and existing evidence from the social 
science of consumer contracting. Part III tests three hypotheses derived from that literature: 
that unfair terms, and the laws that favor them, are more palatable when they are difficult to 
challenge, likely to harm consumers, and longstanding. The evidence from these two studies 
suggests that term deference is at least in part the product of motivated reasoning—the more 
important it is to the individual to justify her place in the transactional ecosystem, the more 
likely she is to believe that she has agency and that the system is fair. Part IV describes the 
implications of this research for consumer contract law as well as for empirical methods in legal 
scholarship.   
 
II. TERM DEFERENCE: EVIDENCE FROM THE LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY OF 
CONTRACT 
 
A. Law of Form Contracts 
 
36 See, e.g., Clayton Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wisc. L. Rev. 679, 680 
(2004) (“Even a rational buyer who anticipates that a proposed contract does not fully 
internalize purchaser interest, for instance, could fail to review terms if the buyer predicted that 
transactional breakdowns to which disfavored terms apply are unlikely to occur.”) 
37 See, e.g., W. Mark Weidemaier, The Arbitration Clause in Context: How Contract Terms Do (And Do 
Not) Define the Process, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 655 (2006). 
38 Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey Miller, and Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers: An 
Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J. L. 
REFORM 871 (2008). 
39 See, e.g. Melvin Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, STAN. L. REV. 211 
(1995). 
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For the most part, American contract law treats consumer contracts as it does person-to-person 
and business-to-business contracts.40 Assent to contracts of adhesion depends on whether the 
parties have manifested an intent to be legally bound. Although the doctrine of assent is the 
flashpoint issue for form contracting, most contemporary deals easily clear the threshold; 
clicking “I agree” is certainly a clearer manifestation of assent than we see in many casebook 
chestnuts.41  
 
Consumer contracts have nonetheless vexed scholars and courts for long enough that the 
American Law Institute has recently proposed a Restatement on Consumer Contracts.42 The 
new Restatement would create doctrinal boundaries between individual-firm contracts and 
business-to-business or arms-length deals that have historically been the core of contracts 
doctrine.43 This is a remarkable development for a field that has historically insisted that form 
contracts are not different than anything else. As Judge Hellerstein of the Southern District of 
New York opined in a software licensing dispute in 2001: 
 
Promises become binding when there is a meeting of the minds and consideration is 
exchanged. So it was at King’s Bench in common law England; so it was under the 
common law in the American colonies; so it was through more than two centuries of 
jurisprudence in this country; and so it is today. Assent may be registered by a signature, 
a handshake, or a click of a computer mouse transmitted across the invisible ether of 
the Internet.44 
 
Judge Hellerstein was arguing that all online contracts do is to introduce new methods of 
manifesting assent, and that as such they do not disrupt assent doctrine; they just add more 
behaviors that are widely understood as agreement to contract. He was both right and wrong. 
Clicking “I Agree” took little time to be widely accepted as a mode of acceptance. However, 
that is not all that online contracting brought to contract doctrine. The rise and proliferation of 
online contracting has arguably moved public and academic opinion on consumer contracting 
 
40 See Omri Ben-Shahar, Foreword to “Boilerplate”: Foundations of Market Contracts Symposium, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 821, 826 (2006) (“On a theoretical level, boilerplate is shown to be a legal 
phenomenon different from contract. Is it a statute? Is it property? Is it a product?”). 
41 See, e.g., Embry vs. McKittrick (1922) (where the manifestation of assent is the employer’s 
reply is “You’re alright, go and get your men out and don’t worry about it.”) 
42 See Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Searching for the Common 
Law”: The Quantitative Approach of the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 7 (2017) 
(recounting and defending the empirical methods behind the draft Restatement case-counting 
approach). 
43 See Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar, and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, The American Law 
Institute’s Restatement of Consumer Contracts: Reporter’s Introduction, 15 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 91 
(2019) (explaining the impetus for carving consumer contracts off from commercial contracts). 
44 Specht v. Netscape Commc'n Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
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for good.45 What Judge Hellerstein’s argument missed, understandably in light of the historical 
context, was that life online would yield an unprecedented volume of standard terms. The sheer 
volume has, in turn, created a new urgency for those who would cleave consumer contracts 
from the doctrinal core.46 It is not that we cannot identify when consumers manifest assent, 
but rather that we might think it sensible to treat them differently when non-readership is baked 
into the system. As many scholars and commentators have observed, documented, and 
bemoaned, it is not possible for any humans to both read the terms of their deals and also 
participate meaningfully in American economic life.47 
 
Controversially, the ALI’s draft Restatement doubles down on the current state of assent 
doctrine, and then adds a more robust set of fraud and unconscionability protections on the 
back end.48 When courts face assent issues in contracts of adhesion, especially online contracts, 
they typically treat the contract in isolation. Did this party in this instance have notice of the 
terms and an opportunity to read them before manifesting assent? This is a granular analysis, 
one that asks about the size of the font and the screen position of the hyperlink, but has no 
interest in the overall rates of readership of such terms or of the cost-benefit calculation of ex 
ante reading.49  
 
The upshot of this state of affairs in consumer contract law is that the black letter law is itself 
quite deferential to firms and terms. A range of highly dubious assent contexts—from long 
boilerplate documents with Sign Here tabs to hyperlinked terms and conditions to rolling 
contracts with terms only available after acceptance—are unequivocally manifestations of 
assent.50 Meanwhile substantive unconscionability is rarely claimed and rarely successful.51 The 
 
45 See, e.g., David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595, 1600–06 (2016) (using experimental studies to show an association 
between age and intuitive formalism).  
46 See Id. 
47 See e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 545, 549 (2014); Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The Failure of Mandatory Disclosure, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011); Todd D. Rakoff, Commentary, The Law and Sociology of Boilerplate, 
104 MICH. L. REV. 1235, 1235 (2006).  
48  See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST.).; See also Alan S. 
Kaplinsky, ALI’s Restatement of The Law, Consumer Contracts: An Ill-Conceived and Poorly Implemented 
Project, BALLARD SPAHR L.L.P. (May 16, 2019), 
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2019/05/16/alis-restatement-of-the-law-
consumer-contracts-an-ill-conceived-and-poorly-implemented-project/. 
49 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. OF 
CONTRACT L 25-26 (2009) (describing the particulars of the opportunity to read as a legal 
fiction). 
50 See, e.g., Matthew Seligman, The Error Theory of Contract Law, 78 MD. L. REV. 147 (2018) 
(arguing that  
51 See, e.g., Nico Cornell, A Complainant-Oriented Approach to Unconscionability and Contract Law, 164 
U. PA. L. REV. 1131 (2015).  
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most successful efforts to bar predatory or usurious practices have been from legislatures, 
prohibiting in some jurisdictions, inter alia, universal default in credit card bills,52 no-cancellation 
policies for automobile purchases, 53  and anti-disparagement clauses. 54  Targeted legislative 
reforms have outlawed some objectionable practices, leaving firms wide latitude otherwise.  
 
B. Field Evidence of Term Deference 
 
If the state of the law is term deference, we might describe the state of behavior as term over-
deference. Collecting data on over-deference is challenging, for at least two reasons. The first is 
that it is a dog that doesn’t bark—the whole point is that people do what their contracts require 
without making a lot of noise (and thus without creating a lot of observable activity). The 
second is that doing what one’s contract requires is normally overdetermined; i.e., it is hard to 
say that it has a cause that is psychological. If I pay my Comcast bill on time, that is not 
psychological; I might feel morally obligated but mostly I just want the cable company to keep 
my internet on. However, a few examples have emerged recently of cases in which it is at least 
plausibly the case that honoring the terms of a contract is all-things-considered 
counterproductive, and yet widespread acquiescence to bad policies persists. 
 
1. Online Shoppers Who Didn’t Quit a 480-item Survey 
 
In 2008, the contracts and organizational behavior scholar Zev Eigen put a survey online.55 
Any participant who agreed to take the survey was promised, in return, a DVD. What 
participants did not know was that the survey was carefully designed to be as obnoxious as 
possible. It had 480 questions. The only way to answer each question was to click inside a very 
small button icon, and each new question appeared on a different part of the screen, preventing 
participants from resting the mouse in a single spot. Each question was its own pop-up, and 
each click to “continue” started a 4-second delay to the next question.56 In other words, subjects 
signed up for something that they almost surely understood to be a short, simple task, in return 
 
52 See, e.g., Adam Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. REG. 
143,  (2009) (arguing that state efforts to legislate lending practices can circumvent national 
failures to address financial services malfeasance). 
53 See, e.g., Jan Smits, Rethinking the Usefulness of Mandatory Rights of Withdrawal in Consumer Contract 
Law: The Right to Change Your Mind, 29 PENN STATE INT’L L. REV. 671 (2010) (reviewing the 
prevalence and utility of cooling-off periods for large-dollar purchasing decisions). 
54 See, e.g., Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the Law of the Poor, 102 GEO. L. 
J. 1383 (2013) (arguing that the fall of the unconscionability was coupled with a rise in statutory 
reforms targeting specific terms). 
55 Zev J. Eigen, Hans Bernd Schäfer & Shyam Sunder, Experimental Evidence of the Relationship 
between Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J.INST. & THEOR. ECON. 
124, 126 (2012) (reporting results from a field study of online contracts to take a survey in 
return for a DVD). 
56 Id. at 129. 
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for a relatively low-value item—these were not new release films. Instead, they were given a 
very unpleasant task that was clearly not worth the prize. We can safely assume that a five-
dollar DVD was not sufficient incentive to get subjects to agree to complete an aggravating 
two-hour task.  
 
At least two puzzles emerged from his findings. First, subjects answered a lot of questions 
before they quit—on average, over 100. A small but non-trivial number of subjects completed 
the entire survey. Second, completion rates were higher for subjects for whom a contract was 
more salient, and higher still for those for whom a contract was salient and a moral norm was 
made salient. When subjects were reminded of the fine print of their deal, they gritted their 
teeth and kept working.  
 
2. California Employees Who Didn’t Leave Their Jobs for Better Offers 
 
Non-compete clauses in employment contracts purport to limit the choices of a worker who 
wants to leave her firm, ostensibly in order to protect a firm’s investment in training and to 
protect trade secrets.57 These terms have been widely criticized, especially as applied to low-
level workers, and are often unenforceable.58 Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara 
have recently shown that the terms receive deference from employees whether or not they are 
legal.59 They used a national survey of employee data from U.S. labor force participants, with 
11,505 respondents covering every state. They then compared participants on two key 
dimensions: first, whether or not the respondent was himself or herself subject to a 
noncompete in her current job; and second, whether the state law governing the employment 
contract enforced noncompete clauses. California, for example, does not permit noncompetes, 
or at least does not enforce them. They found that employees with a non-compete were overall 
5-6 percentage points more likely to report that they would not ever move to a competitor firm. 
They also asked subjects whether their non-compete agreement would be an important factor. 
About half of subjects said that it would, whether they lived in a state with high enforcement 
or low/no enforcement. Non-compete agreements were associated with less job mobility—
longer tenures at the employer with the non-compete, and less reported willingness to move 
jobs—even without a realistic prospect of suit.  
 
 
 
 
57 Chiara F. Orsini, Protecting an Employer's Human Capital: Covenants Not to Compete and the Changing 
Business Environment, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 175, 176–77 (2000) (reviewing evidence and theory in 
support of non-compete agreements for employees across employment sectors). 
58 Rachel Argenbright Rioux, The Necessity for Employer Liability in Unenforceable Non-Compete 
Agreements, 86 UMKC L. REV. 995, 996–98 (2018) (describing the widespread use of non-
compete agreements in contracts with employees unlikely to challenge or bring suit). 
59 Starr, Prescott & Bishara, supra. 
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3. Homeowners Who Didn’t Walk Away  
 
In the months and years following the crisis, millions of American homeowners realized that 
they lived in homes worth considerably less than their outstanding mortgage debt—they were 
“underwater.” Economists predicted widespread “strategic default” in non-recourse states; 
lenders too feared that some of their clients would see that foreclosure was all things considered 
cheaper than staying and paying, and that they would turn over the keys to the bank and start 
fresh.60 What they found to be surprising is that this did not happen, at least not in the droves 
they feared. Many underwater homeowners stayed in their homes and continued paying loans 
for homes that would never again be worth the outstanding debt.61 Here was another example 
of a widespread failure to rebel. 
 
Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales offered an answer.62 They used survey data and 
found that willingness to default was strongly associated with moral beliefs. One of the 
strongest negative predictors of willingness to default was endorsement of the statement that 
it would be morally wrong to walk away. That is, that it would be unfair of the homeowner, vis 
a vis the banks and the social fabric, to undermine the system.  
 
Each of these examples describes a situation in which we have real world evidence that people 
who could get out of their contracts nonetheless stayed on and took a real loss. Although the 
loss in the survey example was perhaps a matter of a few annoying minutes, the employment 
and homeownership cases involve the highest stakes of almost any contract that the average 
American will ever sign. Those cases also suggest that the power that firms have is not entirely 
based on the state’s willingness to put its power behind them; deference to terms is deference 
both to the firm and to the system of consumer contracting.  
 
Deference to the “system” is something that psychologists have been unpacking for at least 
fifty years. The next section recounts the puzzle of system justification from the perspective of 
psychological research, and iterates its natural connections to the phenomenon of term 
deference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
60 Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Breaching the Mortgage Contract: The Behavioral Economics of Strategic Default, 
64 VAND. L. REV. 1547, 1548–51 (2011) (describing the strategic default predictions, and testing 
the role of moral norms in economic decision-making). 
61 Id.  
62 Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Determinants of Attitudes toward Strategic 
Default on Mortgages, 68 J. FIN. 1473 (2013). 
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III. JUSTIFYING THE SYSTEM 
 
Why would people legitimize and support social arrangements that conflict with their 
own self-interest? There are hedonic benefits to minimizing the unpredictable, unjust, 
and oppressive aspects of social reality. 63  
 
Readers familiar with behavioral research, in economics, sociology, or psychology, will find the 
notion of over-deference to authority quite familiar. We see it in in studies of everything from 
political dissent64 to abusive intimate relationships65 to groupthink.66 One of the core insights 
from various disciplines is that compliance is psychologically more attractive—it takes fewer 
personal, emotional, or cognitive resources—than protest. Psychologists have been 
systematically exploring this phenomenon since at least the 1950s, building on Stanley 
Milgram’s insights into obedience to form Melvin Lerner’s just world hypothesis: “People want 
to and have to believe they live in a just world so that they can go about their daily lives with a 
sense of trust, hope and confidence in their future.”67 John Jost’s more complex and testable 
theory of system justification built on this foundation to move from the just world to the 
justified system.68 
 
A. A Just World Feels Good 
 
Like many of us, the psychologist Melvin Lerner was puzzled when he heard about Stanley 
Milgram’s experiments at the Yale psychology lab. After World War II, Milgram had famously 
set out to show that Americans are less blindly obedient than citizens from elsewhere. Instead 
he found that many ordinary people were willing to shock one innocent victims at outrageously 
high levels on nothing more than a bland command to “keep going.”69 Generations of research 
on obedience and conformity shows a high rate of people going along with situations that are 
otherwise not in line with their own values, preferences, or even material self-interest. Lerner 
took a particular view on this research: he theorized that people feel better when they can match 
personal outcomes with personal choices—they feel better about a world in which people get 
what they deserve.   
 
 
63  Melvin. J. Lerner, The Belief in a Just World in THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD A 
FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION 14 (1980). 
64  See e.g., Jerry M. Burger, Replicating Milgram: Would People Still Obey Today?, 64 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 1–11 (2009). 
65 See e.g., Jessica J. Eckstein, 26 JOURNAL OF FAMILY VIOLENCE 21 (2011). 
66 See e.g., Knud S. Larsen, The Asch Conformity Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical Comparison, 
5 J. SOC. BEH. & PERSONALITY 163 (1990). 
67 Lerner supra note 63 at 14. 
68 See, e.g., John T. Jost & Rick Andrews, System Justification Theory, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PEACE PSYCHOLOGY (2011). 
69 Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 371 (1963). 
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In the 1960’s, Lerner began a systematic investigation of the informal observation many of us 
have made: people seem to blame victims for their bad luck. His first studies informed subjects 
that students who worked on a particular task were then entered into a lottery for a prize; the 
prize winner was chosen randomly. The subjects were asked to then assess how hard the 
students worked on the task. What Lerner found was that the winner was judged to have 
worked harder on the task than the losers, a “tendency to match the student’s performance 
with his fate.”70 Lerner formulated a line of research testing the “just world hypothesis”, a set 
of testable predictions about human behavior: 
 
Individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where people generally get 
what they deserve. The belief that the world is just enables the individual to confront 
his physical and social environment as though they were stable and orderly. Without 
such a belief it would be difficult for the individual to commit himself to the pursuit of 
long-range goals or even to the socially regulated behavior of day-to-day life. Since the 
belief that the world is just serves such an important and adaptive function for the 
individual, people are very reluctant to give up this belief, and they can be greatly 
troubled if they encounter evidence that suggests that the world is not really just or 
orderly at all.71  
 
Lerner’s argument feels counterintuitive on a first pass: people must believe that they deserve 
their own bad outcomes in order to feel better? Surely I feel worse when I have both suffered 
a harm and committed a wrong, both worse off and guilty. Is it not preferable to believe that 
the firms I do business with are bad and I am good? The insight from Lerner is that certain 
kinds of blame judgments implicate a broader need for stability and optimism rather than self-
exoneration. I may think that I am right in any particular dispute with Apple, but in a world in 
which my Apple products are all-but-irreplaceable, it may feel better to situate myself 
psychologically as a party with agency rather than a pawn to the whims of Big Business. 
 
B. The Dissonance Resolution Motivation 
 
At its core, the just world hypothesis tests a form of cognitive dissonance resolution. The 
dissonant cognitions are: 1) Someone is suffering a harm and 2) The world is fair and orderly. 
If the tension cannot be resolved in the world—that is, observers cannot meaningfully 
remediate or eliminate the harm—then it must be resolved within the observer herself, by 
changing her beliefs. As a matter of rational processing of evidence, evidence that an innocent 
person is suffering should undermine faith in a just world. The key insight of Lerner and others 
was that the belief in the just world is adaptive, motivated, and strong—so if the just world 
 
70 Melvin J. Lerner & Dale T. Miller, Just World Research and the Attribution Process, 85 PSYCH BULL 
1030, 1031 (1978). 
71 Id. at 1030–31. 
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belief will not give, and the dissonance cannot stand, the vulnerable belief is the belief in 
innocent suffering.  
 
The canonical example of the just world belief has been demonstrated in the context of rape 
victimization. In 1973, Jones and Aronson conducted a study in which they described the rape 
of either a high-status or low-status woman, with otherwise identical details as to the nature of 
the attack.72 (This study describes a set of pre-tested assumptions and a set of findings which 
are embedded in a social and historical context that was quite hostile toward women’s sexual 
autonomy; the method and results described here are, by design, reinforcing pernicious gender 
stereotypes.) Subjects who read about the high-status woman (in this case, a virgin) were more 
likely to recommend a harsh punishment for the rapist. This was not surprising. What was 
surprising, though, was that those subjects were also more likely to report that the victim had 
engaged in risky behavior. That is, when the rape was viewed as particularly threatening—even 
a virgin can be randomly victimized!—her behavior was judged more harshly.73 
 
In 1994, John Jost and Mahzarin Banaji pioneered a new line of psychological research that 
took the just-world hypothesis and couched in terms of a larger set of motivated reasoning 
processes. They observed that there were substantial bodies of literature devoted to the 
explication of justification as a psychological process. They pointed out that researchers had 
considered justificatory motivations in the context of the self and of the in-group, but that they 
could not account for some consistent findings of self- or group-derogation. They proposed 
system justification: the “psychological process by which existing social arrangements are 
legitimized, even at the expense of personal and group interest.”74 
 
The consequences of system justification are well-trodden. System justification makes people feel 
better—it is associated with increased positive affect for both advantaged and disadvantaged 
groups. Indeed, is hard to overstate the importance of system justification in the sense of self 
and world. It is literally associated with mental health: 
 
There is evidence that, at the individual level, system-justifying beliefs and ideologies 
serve the palliative function of decreasing negative affect and increasing positive affect 
and satisfaction with one’s situation…members of disadvantaged groups (such as 
blacks) who reject egalitarian alternatives to the status quo tend to suffer in terms of 
subjective well-being as indexed by levels of self-esteem and depression. 
 
 
72 Cathaleene Jones & Elliot Aronson, Attribution of Fault to A Rape Victim as A Function Of 
Respectability of The Victim, 26 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 415 (1973) (studying victim-
blaming as a function of motivated cognition). 
73 Id. at 418.  
74 John Jost & Mahzarin Banaji, The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of 
False Consciousness, 33 BRITISH J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 1, 2 (1994). 
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System justification should be of particular interest to legal scholars, because it describes the 
tension at the core of much legal scholarship: what is the relationship between is and ought? 
Lerner himself argued that “one of the most commonly observed characteristics of social 
existence is that people imbue social regularities with an ‘ought’ quality”.75 
 
The study of system justification is a study of subtle cognitive shifts, and thus the causation 
question was subject to experimental manipulation by using not actual manipulations of power 
but rather by manipulating the subjective availability of power. Measuring the relationship 
between power and system justification is challenging, because many of the most salient 
associations are derived from observational rather than experimental settings. If it is true, as 
researchers have found repeatedly, that the feeling of powerlessness is correlated with perceived 
legitimacy of the socioeconomic system76, we should still want to know which way the causation 
cuts.  Psychologists at the University of California at Berkeley randomly assigned undergraduate 
subjects to a powerful or a powerless condition. 77 The experimental manipulation was indirect; 
they were interested in the feeling of powerlessness, and thus subjects were asked to either write 
about a time when they had power over someone else, or to write about a time when someone 
else had power over them. The dependent measure was the score on a system justification scale, 
including items like “In general, I find society to be fair” or “Society is set up so that people 
usually get what they deserve.” What the researchers found was that powerlessness yielded 
increased justification; those who had worked themselves into a more dependent mindset were 
more likely to ratify existing hierarchies. 
 
One way to conceptualize the motivation described in the studies below is by thinking about 
the just world/system justification literatures as being about pressure and relief. When people 
experience themselves as helpless or dependent, they experience a cognitive pressure to make 
their situation acceptable. The way to relieve the pressure is to either change the situation 
(unlikely by stipulation) or to develop a positive attitude toward the source of dependence.  
 
C. System Justification and Ideology 
 
For scholars of system justification in psychology, system justification might be triggered by 
something about a situation, but it also might be triggered by something about the person. 
Numerous studies have essentially measured system justification as an individual variable, 
something stable like a character or personality trait. 
 
75 Lerner supra note 63. 
76 John Jost, Brett Pelham, Oliver Sheldon & Bilian Ni Sullivan, Social Inequality and the Reduction 
of Ideological Dissonance on Behalf of the System: Evidence of Enhanced System Justification Among the 
Disadvantaged, 33 EUR. J. OF SOC. PSYCH. 13 (2003). 
77 Jojanneke van der Toorn, Matthew Feinberg, John Jost, Aaron Kay, Tom Tyler, Robb Willer 
& Caroline Wilmuth, A Sense of Powerlessness Fosters System Justification: Implications for the 
Legitimation of Authority, Hierarchy, and Government, 36 POLITICAL PSYCH. 93 (2015). 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, system justification has been studied as a predictor of political ideology, 
and its association with conservatism.78 The connection is intuitive on the language alone, but 
it has also been borne out in the literature. John Jost and his co-authors have looked at political 
conservatism across 12 countries and concluded that conservatism is a form of system 
justification, providing moral and intellectual support for the status quo,79 and this result has 
been replicated longitudinally.80 (An interesting exception to this rule is extreme conservatism, 
which is associated with less system justification.81) Jost’s commentary on “working class 
conservatism” identifies the psychological advantages of conservatism.82 This research has 
explicitly connected the protective psychological function of system justification with 
observations that conservatives tend to be happier than liberals.83 
 
Although the research offered in this Article is not primarily focused on individual differences, 
the evidence from studies of conservatism suggests that if term deference is a motivated 
phenomenon, it may manifest differentially across the ideological spectrum. As such, it is 
treated as an important moderating variable in the experimental research described below.  
 
D. Fine Print as Status Quo 
 
The close nexus between legal judgment and system justification is easily perceived. Law is the 
system. It is the traditional, inescapable articulation of state power. Contract law is a salient 
instantiation of legal authority appears in daily life; consumer contracting, meanwhile, is also 
the enforcement mechanism for the power of firms over individuals.   
 
About ten years ago, scholars from at least four different methodological disciplines began to 
observe and probe the fact of widespread fealty to contracts of adhesion. Conceptually (if not 
always chronologically), the first insight was simply that it is not possible to read all the fine 
print. In 2011 Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider laid out in hilarious detail the ridiculous 
 
78 John T. Jost, Danielle Gaucher, and Chadly Stern,“The World Isn’t Fair”: A System Justification 
Perspective on Social Stratification and Inequality, in 2 APA HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY AND 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 317–40 (M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver ed., 2015). 
79 John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition. 129 PSYCH. BULL. 3, 339–
375 (2003). 
80 Miriam Matthews et al., A Longitudinal Test of the Model of Political Conservatism as Motivated Social 
Cognition, 30 POL. PSYCH. 6, 921–36 (2009). 
81  Luca Caricati, Evidence of Decreased System Justification Among Extreme Conservatives in Non-
American Samples, J. SOCIAL PSYCH., Jan. 2019, at 1–22. 
82 John T. Jost, Working Class Conservatism: A System Justification Perspective, 18 CURRENT OPINION 
IN PSYCH. 73–78 (2017). 
83  Sebastian Butz et al., Why Are Conservatives Happier than Liberals? Comparing Different 
Explanations Based on System Justification, Multiple Group Membership, and Positive Adjustment, 47 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 3, 362–72 (2017). 
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demands that disclosures make on consumers.84 They made a convincing case that reading 
contracts would be incompatible with the basic functions of human life—you cannot hold 
down a job or have a social life or participate responsibly in family obligations and also read all 
your disclosures.85 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler and David R. Trossen analyzed a 
data set of hundreds of thousands of online license agreements, and documented readership of 
online agreements at a rate well below one tenth of one percent of consumer parties.86 Victoria 
Plaut and Bobby Bartlett surveyed consumers and found that the majority reported rarely 
reading their form contracts, with many citing the difficulty (too long and/or too complex to 
understand) or the lack of choice.87 In each of these studies, researchers described a world in 
which individuals do not and largely cannot read the terms of their contracts, but one where 
manifestations of assent are required to participate in economic and social activity.  
 
This raised a serious question for scholars interested in norms: how could such a state of affairs 
be acceptable? Why did people continue to click, or continue to perform, or continue to 
patronize firms requiring these practices? Even if the answer to those questions had to do with 
pragmatic participation in a market with few alternatives—why were there no high-profile op-
eds or consumer advocacy movements gaining traction? In other words: why defer to terms? 
 
In 2014 I published a study that pinpointed, though certainly did not resolve, the perplexing 
tension. Subjects read a story about a consumer subject to a fine that surprised him, buried as 
it was in the fine print of his banking contract. Subjects were randomly assigned to read either 
that the contract was very long (15 pages) or pretty short (2 pages). They answered two 
important questions: Was it reasonable to expect him to have known about the fee? Whose 
fault is it that he did not know about the fee? Subjects in the two conditions clearly 
differentiated as to the first question; they thought it was unreasonable to expect readership of 
a long contract and reasonable to expect it with a short contract. However, in both conditions, 
subjects thought that the consumer was clearly to blame for his predicament.88  
 
As discussed above, traditional system justification research in psychology has been motivated 
by the anecdotal reports that disadvantaged groups often support the very system that has 
 
84 BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra, at 705–09. 
85 Id. 
86 Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? 
Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEG. STUD. 21–24 (2014). 
87 Victoria Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett III, Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-
Readership of Click-Through Agreements, 36 L. & HUMAN BEH. 293 (2012) (positing a cluster of 
reasons that justify or bolster non-readership, including trust in firms and trust in government 
oversight). 
88 See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1745 
(2014) (reporting an experimental study of consumer judgments based on procedural fairness). 
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worked to subjugate them.89 The disadvantaged claim that their own inequitable position or 
outcome is the result of a fair process. This is a reasonable way of describing the state of the 
scholarship in consumer contracting: the American consumer marketplace requires individuals 
to manifest consent to a range of terms without meaningful opportunity to understand, 
challenge, or refuse those terms. There is little evidence of revolt or complaint, and indeed 
there is ample evidence of compliance—people comply even when compliance is costly, as in 
the mortgage case, and they justify compliance by arguing that contracting as a system is fair.  
 
Prior research in psychology predicts motivation to justify the system in particular contexts, 
each of which is fundamentally associated with the sense that something unfair needs to be 
rationalized.90 Recently experimental research in contract psychology directly links to at least 
three relevant factors: 91 
 
1. Inevitability. There is more pressure to justify a situation that feels more 
inevitable; if it were escapable, the situation rather than the cognition could shift. We 
already have evidence from contracts that this factor is in play. I have explored the 
inevitability variable in a small follow-up study reported in 2017, in which I asked 
subjects to evaluate whether a company hiding a fee in documents not obviously 
presented as part of the contract was fair or not. Half of the subjects read that a 
consumer complained about the fee in small claims court and the judge ruled it 
enforceable; half read that the judge ruled it unenforceable. The overall fairness of the 
company’s business practice was deemed overall fair when it looked enforceable, but 
when subjects were introduced to the idea that it might not be so inevitable, they judged 
it more harshly.  
 
2. Inequity salience. There is more pressure to justify a bad outcome, because it 
feels worse and thus requires cognitive remediation. This is referred to in the literature 
as “inequity salience.” The idea is just that people are motivated to defend the system 
when it becomes especially clear that the system poses a threat. This has also been 
shown in the contract context. In one study in 2014, I asked subjects to read a 
description of a consumer whose insurance policy included a hidden clause prohibiting 
recovery for damage by vandalism. Subjects thought that the hidden clause was 
 
89 See e.g., John T. Jost, Working Class Conservatism: A System Justification Perspective, 18 CURRENT 
OPINION IN PSYCHOLOGY 73, 73–78 (2017). 
90 “System justification motivation is activated (or increased) when (a) the individual feels 
dependent on or controlled by the system and its authorities; (b) the status quo is perceived as 
inevitable or inescapable; (c) inequality in the system is made especially salient; (d) the system 
is criticized, challenged, or threatened; and (e) the system is perceived as traditional or 
longstanding.” John T. Jost, Danielle Gaucher & Chadly Stern, “The World Isn’t Fair”: A System 
Justification Perspective on Social Stratification and Inequality, 2 APA HANDBOOK ON PERSONALITY 
AND SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 317 (2015). 
91 Id. 
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problematic—unless they read that the policyholder had been vandalized. Once the 
harm was a fait accompli, they rated the contract as more fair overall. 
 
3. Tradition: There is greater pressure to justify longstanding systems; a more 
entrenched status quo is less malleable. This is true for contract terms, too. In one 
relevant study, subjects indicated that they were more likely to defer to banks that were 
“traditional and conservative” than those who were offering novel financial products 
in the mortgage market.92 A similar finding from 2014 described a term permitting a 
retailer to share personal information with third parties. In the control condition 
subjects on average judged the consumer to be slightly more to blame than the firm, 
but when the term was described as “recently changed” by the drafter, the comparative 
blame burden shifted to the firm.93 
 
In the three studies that follow, I use new scenario studies to sharpen these inferences, homing 
in on the causal connection between these proposed triggers of justificatory motivation and 
support for firm-deferential contract law. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SURVEY STUDIES 
 
The goal of the experimental studies is to test the hypothesis that term deference is motivated 
reasoning. The studies draw directly from the existing literature in cognitive psychology on 
motivated reasoning, leveraging four known predictors of justificatory pressure: inevitability, 
tradition, inequity, and ideology.  
 
These studies are also exploratory. Term deference involves at least three relevant actors: the 
consumer, the firm, and the state. The primary prediction here is that attitudes toward 
consumer contract enforcement are motivated by psychological pressure to justify the existing 
system. As such, they should be responsive to manipulations that increase or decrease that 
pressure. Negative attributions about victims of bad terms (consumers) and more positive 
attributions about the perpetrators of the terms (firms) should also reflect the level of 
justificatory pressure. Third, but less clearly, these studies aim to explore the extent to which 
attributions of meaningful consent are motivated reasoning phenomena, insofar as a reasonable 
resolution of dissonance is to attribute harm to the victim’s knowing consent. Finally, each of 
these predictions is assessed in light of subjects’ self-reported ideological orientation, reflecting 
the longstanding finding that political conservatism is associated with preference for the status 
quo. 
 
A. Study 1: Inevitability 
 
 
92 See Wilkinson-Ryan supra note 60 at 1568. 
93 Id. 
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One of the central reasons to like the system we have is that it is not easily changed. As anyone 
who compares a casebook from 2020 with a casebook from 1950 will see, contract law is very 
slow to change. However, individual terms themselves are not so implacable. Many terms are 
absolutely subject to successful challenge. In this study, I predict that a term that is deemed 
certainly enforceable under current law will be viewed as better (more fair, more reasonable, 
reflecting more favorably on the firm) than the same term described as potentially 
unenforceable. Although there are reasons to believe that all else being equal, enforceable terms 
are actually on average more fair and reasonable than unenforceable terms, the scenario here is 
designed to try to parcel that out. In both cases consumers receive information that the term 
was recently challenged, and in both cases they have full information about the content of the 
term. The dependent variable is whether, irrespective of its legal status, enforcement of the 
term is fair. The central question for this study is: Does the inevitability of consumer contract 
enforcement motivate positive attitudes toward terms and drafters?  
 
1. Method 
 
The method described in both studies here is a short vignette study. Subjects were recruited 
from the online survey platform, Prolific, and were paid $1.00 to complete a 3-minute 
questionnaire advertised as a “Cell Phone Study.” 
 
The vignette describes a consumer, Ashley, who is subject to an unexpected change in her cell 
phone plan after she misses a single payment. Recall that one of the predictors of system 
justification instantiation is the belief that the system is inevitable. The less room for the system 
to move, the more adjustment people have to do cognitively. The basic scenario read as follows: 
 
When Ashley bought her last phone, a new phone but an older model, she 
signed up for a two-year contract with her service provider under their 
Summer Unlimited Data Deal promotion. The phone company was offering 
an unlimited data plan plus a monthly payment plan on the phone, which came 
out to about $79 per month. 
 
Ashley signed up for the deal at the store. She asked the sales agent about the 
phone’s warranty (90 days, no coverage for cracked screen) and the late fees 
($10 fee for late payment of any bill).  
 
The paper contract the agent had her sign was quite long—around 17 total 
sheets of paper with pretty small print. She did not read it in the store, but 
initialed each page and signed her name at the very end. The sales agent told 
her where she could find a complete copy of the terms on their website. She 
did not follow up to read them. 
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One of the clauses in the contract read: 
 
“39: Late Payment Plan Reversion: Promotional data rates only valid 
with User’s payment plan compliance. In the event of one or more late 
payments, data plan will revert to standard data pricing for the 
remainder of contract term.”    
 
Ashley’s payment slipped her mind while she was on vacation the following 
August, and her payment was a week late, so she included an extra $10. The 
following bill was for $115. She called the company, confused, and they 
referred her to Clause 39. 
 
Subjects in this study were randomly assigned to one of two conditions.94 In a previous study, 
described in Part III, I have shown that a judicial opinion stating that an unfair term is 
unenforceable has a strong effect on consumer perceptions of that term. This study was meant 
to replicate that finding, but without directly conveying that a legal authority had denounced 
the term. As such, both subjects read about a challenge to the term (thus conveying in both 
conditions that the term had made at least some people unhappy), but one read that the suit 
was ongoing and another read it had been resolved in favor of the firm. Resolution in favor of 
the firm means that the term is literally inevitable, and ongoing suit suggests an escape route. 
 
Inevitable The customer service agent she spoke to was 
friendly and sympathetic, but did not have 
much to offer.  
 
He told Ashley, “We’ve actually gotten 
sued about this before, and the company 
won. This contract is here to stay.” 
Escapable The customer service agent she spoke to was 
friendly and sympathetic. 
 
He told Ashley, “We’re actually getting 
sued over this now. I think there’s a 
chance this policy is on its way out.” 
 
 
94 Other subjects who took this same study were exposed to four other possible conditions 
pilot-testing hypotheses and stimuli related to this project. Some results were significant. 
However, I do not report those results here because on review, it was clear that the wording 
created too many confounding factors, including ambiguity about the facts and at least one 
concern about demand effects.   
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Subjects answered five follow-up questions, presented in random order: 
 
 Consent: Ashley consented to Clause 39 imposing the late payment data plan 
reversion. 
 Fair Law: A law enforcing the clause is fair. 
 Reasonable Practice: This contract reflects a reasonable business practice by the 
company. 
 Consumer Blame & Company Blame were presented as paired sliders, shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Blame response sliding indicators  
 
 
2. Results 
 
989 subjects participated via the online research platform Prolific. 51.8% of subjects were male. 
Ages ranged from 18 to 72 with a median age of 28. On a 100-point scale where 0 was 
“Extremely Conservative” and 100 was “Extremely Liberal”, the median subject rated their 
political views at 64, and fewer than one quarter of subjects indicated that they were more 
conservative than 50. 189 subjects were randomly assigned to the Inevitable condition and 175 
subjects to the Escapable condition. There were no differences in political affiliation by 
condition. 
 
a. Main Effects of Manipulation 
 
The predicted effect of the experimental manipulation was that when the term seemed less 
vulnerable to challenge, the inevitability would increase pressure on subjects to justify consumer 
contract enforcement. The data bore this out here. When the term was robust to legal challenge, 
subjects thought enforcement was more fair (W=188862, p=.014), that the customer was more 
 24 
at fault (W=18673.5, p=.025), and that the company was less at fault (W=14245, p=.073).95 
Neither the Consent nor the Reasonable Practice variables were significantly different by 
condition. Figure 2 shows the main results as mean comparisons. 
  
Figure 2. Mean responses, by Inevitability condition, for each response variable. 
 
 
b. Results by Ideology 
 
In an exploratory analysis of these results, in part to confirm the mechanism, results were also 
parsed by political affiliation. First, I ran a simple linear regression with politics, age, and sex as 
the independent variables and each response variable as the dependent variable. Here, for 
simplification I report the estimate and the significance level only (where * is p < .1, ** p < .05, 
*** p <.01). Results statistically significant at the p < .10 level are bolded.  
 
Table 2. Regression coefficients of Political Affiliation, Age, and Sex for each response 
variable. 
 Politics Age Sex 
Fair Law -.006 -.014 -.326* 
Consumer Fault -.139*** .164 .743 
 
95 Statistical significance is tested using Wilcoxon rank-sum tests here. A rank-sum statistical 
tests the null hypothesis that one median in a pair is not higher or lower than the other—i.e., 
is not predictably ranked higher (rather than the more familiar t-test, which tests the null 
hypothesis that two samples have the same mean). This is a more conservative test of 
significance than the t-test, but it does not assume normal distribution, which is largely more 
appropriate for Likert-scale data.  
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Company Fault .275*** -.051 .513 
Reasonable Practice -.014*** -.006 -.007 
Consent -.006* .001 .141 
 
As the table shows, for Consent, Consumer Fault, Company Fault, and Reasonable Practice, 
ideology was significantly predictive of subject responses, collapsing across conditions. The 
direction of the effect was as expected; conservative subjects were statistically more likely to 
support enforcement, infer consent, blame the consumer, and favor the firm.  
 
Previous work on motivated reasoning and political beliefs suggest that ideology may not only 
predict an overall affinity for reinforcing the status quo, but that it may also interact with a 
trigger, such as inevitability—that some people are more responsive than others to systems 
salience manipulations. I conducted this analysis in a relatively blunt way: I divided subjects 
into two groups, with 50 and below classified as “conservative” and 51 and above classified as 
“liberal.” This yielded 125 conservative subjects and 239 liberal subjects. (Note that both here 
and in the following studies, the response midpoint—here 50—is coded as conservative. 
Although it is not strictly important where the cut is made, since any cut bifurcates the sample 
into “more liberal” and “more conservative,” the choice to include subjects who are presumably 
indicating that they view themselves as moderate in the conservative group reflects an emerging 
body of literature suggesting a liberal skew in self-reported indices of political ideology.96)   
 
First, collapsing across conditions, as I reported above, conservative subjects as a group were 
significantly more likely to find consent, to blame Ashley, to not blame the firm, and to find 
the business practice reasonable. 
 
Second, there were no clear interactions for consent or reasonable practice (both groups stayed 
relatively even across conditions). There were also no interaction effects for the Fair question; 
both groups found the law more fair when it was inevitable. Statistical reports are described in 
the footnote, and these comparisons are illustrated in Figures 3-6, and considered further as 
part of an overall picture in the discussion following the Figures.97 
 
3. Discussion of Study 1 Results 
 
 
96 See, e.g., Andy Brownback & Aaron Novotny, Social desirability bias and polling errors in the 2016 
presidential election, 74 J. BEH. EXP. PSYCH. 38 (2018) (documenting the relationship between anti-
conservative social desirability beliefs and pro-liberal polling bias in the 2016 election.) 
97 The result is significant for Liberal subjects only. Conservative: W=2249.5, p=.123; Liberal: 
W=8116, p=.046. Consumer to Blame, Conservative: W=1900.5, p=.820 vs. Liberal: W=8690, 
p=.002. Company to Blame, Conservative:  W=1929.5, p=.823 vs. Liberal: W=5620, p=.014.  
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Study 1 showed some clear patterns and some suggestive puzzles. First, all subjects were more 
likely to judge a law enforcing the term as fair when they learned that a challenge to the term 
had failed in court—that is, when they were given to understand that enforcement was indeed 
the law rather than when enforcement was uncertain. Enforcement, here the operationalization 
of inevitability, predicted justification of the system. 
 
This pattern also played out for the blame variables, but it was more nuanced. Conservative 
subjects blamed the consumer more than the company whether or not the term was certainly 
enforceable. Liberal subjects, on the other hand, blamed the company more than the consumer 
when enforcement was uncertain, and the consumer more than the firm when it was inevitable.  
 
The Reasonable Practice variable, meant to be a judgment of whether the firm’s behavior was 
acceptable (justified) was highly related to ideology and unaffected by the experimental 
manipulation. Overall, subjects found the company’s behavior to be neutral-to-slightly-
unreasonable. 
 
Finally, Consent was weakly associated with conservatism in the regression analysis, but 
unaffected by the experimental manipulation. Perhaps the most striking result here was the 
overall valence of consent responses. Very few subjects thought that Ashley had not consented. 
74% of subjects found unequivocal to the term, and only 17% thought she had not consented. 
The median rating of consent on the 1-7 scale was 6. This is a striking result, insofar as it 
suggests that whether or not subjects thought Ashley was the victim of an unfair firm or an 
unfair rule, they viewed her participation as a constant. 
 
B. Study 2: Tradition, Inequity, and Ideology 
 
The second study takes up two additional predictors of motivated reasoning: inequity salience 
and longevity. Previous research argues that motivation to defend the status quo increases when 
there is something to defend—that is, when a harm or inequity becomes more salient. Separate 
studies also offer evidence that motivation to defend the status quo increases when the status 
quo appears entrenched over a long time. 
 
Study 2 essentially takes the predictions of tradition and inequity salience and turns them on 
their heads. It uses a control scenario in which the contract is explicitly harmful to the 
protagonist and implicitly standard or longstanding, and then uses experimental manipulations 
designed to take the justificatory pressure off the subject.  
 
In No Harm, subjects see either the core scenario in which Ashley is removed from the cheaper 
phone plan, or a scenario with no salient harm—reducing the motivation to justify the term 
because there is no harm to assimilate. In New Term, subjects see either the core scenario or a 
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scenario that suggests that the term is a novel practice for the firm, which is predicted to make 
it less urgent to defend.  
 
1. Method 
 
Study 2 used the same core scenario from Study 1. In Study 2, the control condition was the 
same base scenario described above, with no additional narrative describing any conversation 
with the sales representative. Instead, the two comparison conditions were: No Harm and New 
Contract. Both of these conditions are compared to the core scenario from Study 1. The No 
Harm condition removes the information about the charges Ashley faced, and the New 
Contract condition included information that the contract terms were newly drafted. Exact 
language is below: 
 
 
No Harm Harm 
… 
 
The paper contract the agent had her sign 
was quite long—around 17 total sheets of 
paper with pretty small print. She did not 
read it in the store, but initialed each page and 
signed her name at the very end. The sales 
agent told her where she could find a 
complete copy of the terms on their website. 
She did not follow up to read them. 
 
One of the clauses in the contract read: 
 
“39: Late Payment Plan Reversion: 
Promotional data rates only valid with 
User’s payment plan compliance. In the 
event of one or more late payments, data 
plan will revert to standard data pricing 
for the remainder of contract term.”    
 
… 
 
The paper contract the agent had her sign 
was quite long—around 17 total sheets of 
paper with pretty small print. She did not 
read it in the store, but initialed each page and 
signed her name at the very end. The sales 
agent told her where she could find a 
complete copy of the terms on their website. 
She did not follow up to read them. 
 
One of the clauses in the contract read: 
 
“39: Late Payment Plan Reversion: 
Promotional data rates only valid with 
User’s payment plan compliance. In the 
event of one or more late payments, data 
plan will revert to standard data pricing 
for the remainder of contract term.”    
 
Ashley’s payment slipped her mind while she 
was on vacation the following August, and 
her payment was a week late, so she included 
an extra $10. The following bill was for $115. 
She called the company, confused, and they 
referred her to Clause 39. 
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New Traditional 
… 
 
The paper contract the agent had her sign 
was quite long—around 17 total sheets of 
paper with pretty small print. The sales agent 
said, “The legal team just added in a bunch 
of terms, so this is hot off the presses!” She 
did not read it in the store, but initialed each 
page and signed her name at the very end. 
The sales agent told her where she could find 
a complete copy of the terms on their 
website. She did not follow up to read them. 
 
One of the new clauses in the contract read: 
 
“39: Late Payment Plan Reversion: 
Promotional data rates only valid with 
User’s payment plan compliance. In the 
event of one or more late payments, data 
plan will revert to standard data pricing 
for the remainder of contract term.”    
 
Ashley’s payment slipped her mind while she 
was on vacation the following August, and 
her payment was a week late, so she included 
an extra $10. The following bill was for $115. 
She called the company, confused, and they 
referred her to Clause 39. 
… 
 
The paper contract the agent had her sign 
was quite long—around 17 total sheets of 
paper with pretty small print. She did not 
read it in the store, but initialed each page and 
signed her name at the very end. The sales 
agent told her where she could find a 
complete copy of the terms on their website. 
She did not follow up to read them. 
 
 
 
One of the clauses in the contract read: 
 
“39: Late Payment Plan Reversion: 
Promotional data rates only valid with 
User’s payment plan compliance. In the 
event of one or more late payments, data 
plan will revert to standard data pricing 
for the remainder of contract term.”    
 
Ashley’s payment slipped her mind while she 
was on vacation the following August, and 
her payment was a week late, so she included 
an extra $10. The following bill was for $115. 
She called the company, confused, and they 
referred her to Clause 39. 
 
 
2. Results 
 
800 subjects were paid $.75-1.00 to complete a 3-minute questionnaire.98 43.8% of respondents 
were male. Ages ranged from 18 to 74 with a median age of 29. Political ideology was measured 
on a 0-7 scale, where 0 was Extremely Conservative, 3-4 was Moderate, and 7 was Extremely 
Liberal. The median response was a 5 and the modal response was 4, with a mean of 4.6. There 
were no significant differences in political ideology by condition. 
 
98 The variable payment was an error; all subjects were supposed to be paid $1.00. There were 
no differences in results by payment level. 
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In order to compare some basic effects of ideology, I isolated the data from the control 
condition only. Regression coefficients including ideology as well as age and sex are reported 
in the footnote, and means are reported in Table 3.99 Political Ideology here is reported as a 
binary variable with 1-4 coded as Conservative and 5-7 coded as Liberal. These results draw 
only from the Control condition, which had 107 subjects coded as Conservative and 145 
subjects coded as Liberal.100 
 
Table 3. Study 2 Mean Differences for Response Variables, Control Condition only, by 
Political Ideology 
 Conservative Liberal p-value101 
Consent 5.25 5.47 .226 
Fair Law 4.50*** 3.79 .001 
Consumer Fault 71.23** 62.95 .019 
Company Fault 47.60 52.83 .174 
Reasonable Practice 4.09** 3.66 .043 
 
Liberalism was associated (not necessarily significantly) with finding the law to be less fair, the 
consumer to be less to blame, the company to be more to blame, and the business practice to 
be less reasonable.  
 
a. No Harm (Non-Salient Inequity) 
 
There was no main effect (i.e., no effect by condition without dividing the sample by ideology) 
for Consent, Fair Law, or Reasonable Practice. There were main effects of condition for both 
blame variables, in the predicted directions102, meaning that when there was no harm resulting 
 
99 Study 2 Regression coefficients of Political Affiliation, Age, and Sex for each response 
variable (Control condition Only): 
 Politics Age Sex 
Consent .105* .018 -.018** 
Fair Law -.263*** -.012 .159 
Consumer Fault -2.35** .044 6.93** 
Company Fault 2.38** -.103 -4.81 
Reasonable Practice -.181** -.004 .048 
 
100 Control condition only is used here in order to test the effect of ideology in a single snapshot 
rather than aggregating across conditions where we might expect the effect of ideology to vary 
by condition.  
101 All p-values calculated from Wilcoxon rank-sum tests. 
102 Consumer Blame: No Harm 61.9, Harm 66.5 (W=28759.5, p=.017). Company Blame: No 
Harm 54.7, Harm 50.5 (W=34850, p=.080). 
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from the term, subjects were more likely to blame the company and less likely to blame the 
consumer. 
 
Liberal subjects did not significantly differentiate between the No Harm and Harm 
conditions.103 Conservative subjects found the law significantly more fair when the bad term 
led to a harm.104 See Figure 3. 
 
A similar pattern emerged for Consumer Blame. Liberal subjects did not significantly differ by 
condition. Conservative subjects levied substantially more blame against the consumer when 
they learned there was a concrete harm from the term.105 These effects are pictured in Figure 4 
below. 
 
b. New Term (Non-traditional) 
 
For the New Term test, the prediction was that the newly-drafted contract, because it is less 
“traditional or long-standing,” should provoke less pressure to justify, and therefore should be 
viewed as less fair, less the consumer’s fault, and more the fault of the firm.  
 
There was a significant main effect of the manipulation on Consent, Company Fault, and, 
marginally, on Reasonable Practice. There was no main effect on Consumer Fault or Fair Law, 
though both overall trended in the predicted direction. Overall, subjects were more likely to 
indicate that the consumer had consented to the term when the term was traditional 
(W=39928.5, p=.028).  
 
Subjects were marginally less likely to find the company’s practice reasonable in the New Term 
condition, but the difference was not statistically significant (New Term mean: 3.62, Traditional 
Term mean: 3.85, W=38539.5, p=.119). 
 
Liberal subjects did not differentiate significantly between the New Term and Control contract 
condition for the Fair variable (W=11450 p=.928). Conservative subjects found the law 
significantly less fair in the New Term condition (W=7738, p=.027). The same pattern emerged 
for the Consumer Fault variable (Liberal: W=10917, p=.751; Conservative: W=7670.5, p=.040). 
 
In Study 2, the pattern of results on the Fair and Blame variables is almost exactly what prior 
research would predict. For conservative but not liberal subjects, the law is fair and the 
consumer is to blame unless the justificatory pressure is reduced by either lack of harm or by a 
non-traditional term.  
 
 
103 W=10897, p=.328. 
104 W=5114.5, p=.013. 
105 W=4940.5, p=.006. 
 31 
The consent results here are uneven. Subjects overall indicated substantially less consent to a 
new term. It is possible that this pattern is also latent in the Harm manipulation, where those 
who did not see a harm were less certain about consent than those who did see the harm, but 
there is not enough power here to discern whether this trend is robust.  
 
C. Summary Results for Studies 1 and 2: Fairness, Blame, Ideology, and Motivation 
 
Figures 3-6 below aggregate results from Studies 1 and 2 for two main variables of interest: Is 
the law fair?, and Is the consumer to blame? These charts are presented in pairs for purposes 
of comparison. They show the effects for each manipulation, for conservatives and for liberals, 
respectively. Note that in each case significant differences are marked on histograms with an 
asterisk (*) symbol. Signficance tests reported above.  
 
Figure 3. Effect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of Fairness, 
Conservative Subjects 
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Figure 4. Effect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of Fairness, Liberal 
Subjects 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Effect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of Consumer 
Blameworthiness, Conservative Subjects 
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Figure 6. Effect of Experimental Manipulations on Judgments of Consumer 
Blameworthiness, Liberal Subjects 
 
 
 
V. DISCUSSION & IMPLICATIONS 
 
A. Discussion of Results 
 
The broad hypothesis of the studies here is that term deference is a motivated reasoning 
phenomenon that increases with intensity as individuals feel increased psychological pressure 
to ameliorate their attitudes toward the status quo. I measured deference in two primary ways: 
perceived fairness of the law was one, and allocation of blame between the parties was the other. 
The more fair the law, and the more blame shouldered by the consumer, the more deference. 
The prediction for each study was that as subjects felt more psychological pressure to justify a 
contract, they would be more deferential to the term and the law. 
 
In order to operationalize the psychological pressure, I borrowed from the system justification 
literature. In particular, I borrowed two main findings. The first is that people feel more 
pressure to justify a system when the inequitable results of the system are salient—i.e., when 
the system seems worse there is a greater need to rationalize it. The second is that people feel 
more pressure to justify a system when the system seems particularly entrenched. The idea here 
is that when a bad outcome can be remediated or avoided with action, people often choose 
that path. When the outcomes are unmoveable, it is the perceptions that must change instead. 
Study 1 operationalized that intransigence by making either the law itself or the contract itself 
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seem more or less open to challenge, and Study 2 operationalized it by casting the term as either 
a standard part of an existing contract or a new term recently added.  
 
The motivated reasoning literature in psychology measures not only situational triggers but also 
individual differences. System justification is associated with, among other things, political 
conservatism. As such, I also explored the possibility that I would see stronger results among 
conservative respondents than among liberal respondents, which I tested more systematically 
in Study 2.  
 
The results showed a consistent pattern: subjects overall responded to the Fairness and Blame 
questions as predicted. When there was more pressure to justify—when the consumer had been 
hit by the term’s penalty, or when the contract was standard, or when the law was clearly in 
favor of the drafter—they found the law more fair, the company less to blame, and the 
consumer more to blame.  
 
Overall, term deference was associated with conservatism. This was true whether I compared 
responses to a single scenario, or whether I compared the effects of the experimental 
manipulations for conservative versus liberal respondents.  
 
Finally, the consent variable did not yield any easily-summarized patterns. The one 
manipulation that showed clear results was that subjects thought that the consumer had 
consented less to the new term than to the control. Otherwise consent was only marginally 
associated with political ideology, and the sign reversed from Study 1 to Study 2. Perhaps the 
most important data point on assent was the widespread agreement among subjects that the 
consumer did consent. The median consent rating in Study 1 was 6 out of 7, for example. Even 
as the other variables shifted and hovered around the midpoint, consent ratings were very high. 
This is essentially a null result, but I discuss some possible interpretations in line with parallel 
literatures from other scholars below. 
 
In sum, these results come together to offer at least proof of concept: deference to contract 
terms increases with increased psychological pressure to justify the existing regime. This is 
evidence to support the proposition that acceptance of terms is a motivated reasoning 
phenomenon. It feels better to believe that the system works.  
 
B. Implications for Contract Law 
 
1. Rhetoric 
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One of the persistent challenges for descriptive research in legal scholarship is the jump from 
a characterization of what the world is like to a prescription for what law should be like.106 To 
start cautiously: this research suggests that existing legal rules may be out of line with evolving 
norms or technologies and perhaps insufficiently protective of consumer vulnerabilities. It is 
not obvious that contract law itself is the right medium for increasing challenges to bad terms, 
but it is the case that judicial rhetoric—i.e., the way courts talk about assent—has not caught 
up to the modern realities of consumer contracting.107 Granular assent analyses with detailed 
attention to the location of the hyperlink or the size of a font are not transparent about the 
state of modern readership.108 One of the benefits of loosening assent analysis, as in the 
proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts draft, is the possibility that courts might be 
more frank about the tradeoffs that they are making.109 Courts might admit that almost any 
hidden term is as non-salient as any other, and that the consumer’s “duty to read” is no longer 
analytically sensible, much less dispositive. Whether or not we agree with what courts are 
deciding, it seems clear that courts are not justifying their decisions in terms of the realities of 
the world their litigants inhabit.110 This is a critique of assent rhetoric, a suggestion that courts 
could serve as a counterpoint to the cultural tropes of the feckless consumer described in Part 
I.  
 
2. Enforcing Unenforceability: Reforming or Disrupting 
 
By contrast, the doctrinal implications that rise to the fore from this research are largely about 
allocating rights and remedies when parties—either parties to the contract or public agencies—
bring a court a contract with unenforceable terms. Any student of contract law is familiar with 
 
106 See generally., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behabioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593 (2013) (articulating a frustration with the limited normative and 
prescriptive arguments from traditional descriptive scholarship). 
107 See, e.g., Adam Levitin, Nancy S. Kim, Christina L. Kunz, Peter Linzer, Patricia A. McCoy, 
Juliet Moringiello, Elizabeth A. Renuart & Lauren E. Willis, The Faulty Foundation of the Draft 
Restatement of Consumer Contracts, 36 YALE J. REG. 447 (2019). 
108 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3 at 127-128 (“All told, the law of assent in consumer 
contracting leaves us in an uneasy place: anyone reading a judicial opinion in contract law would 
have no reason to think that assent to standard terms is dead. But surely analyzing assent to 
consumer contracts in any kind of granular way is disingenuous when we all know that 
consumer contracts are unreadable all the time, no matter how close or how far the link to the 
“Privacy Policy” is to the “Checkout” button.”). 
109 See, e.g., the Draft Restatement of Consumer Contracts from April 2015, arguing in favor of 
a “grand bargain” approach that “allows for relatively easy adoption of the standard contract 
terms that businesses draft, balanced by a set of substantive boundary restrictions that prohibit 
businesses from going too far.” See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS, Council Draft 
No. 2, Introductory Note, on file with author. 
110 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. 
L. REV. 545 (2014) (proposing to solve the problem of non-readership with updated empirical 
information about consumer expectations). 
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the remedies for breach of contract—expectation damages111 , reliance damages112 , maybe 
specific performance if you’re very lucky and/or transferring land113. But most scholars have 
spent much less time on the “remedies” for bad terms.114 In this section, I briefly outline two 
possible ways of conceptualizing how courts approach bad deals. The first is a form of 
reformation, the idea that the court seeks to reform the contract to bring it in line with a version 
of the deal that is legally acceptable.115 The second approach is a sort of blowing-up rather than 
a smoothing-over; a court might treat the unenforceable term as a reason to trash the deal rather 
than repair it.  
 
a. Reformation 
 
In the first-year contracts course, students learn that the remedy for a contract based on a 
misrepresentation, or an unconscionable deal, is that the contract is void and the consumers go 
back to square one—i.e., restitution damages, the deal unwound and the parties extricated from 
one another.116 But what happens if a contract includes a single unenforceable term? What 
happens if a contract includes, for example, a stipulated damages clause that is unenforceable 
as a penalty?117 In that case, does the court declare that the parties have no obligations to one 
another? No, the court strikes the clause and replaces it with the default remedy of judicially-
determined expectation damages.118 The same is true for unfair terms generally. The default 
position in contract law is that contracts are severable such that unenforceable terms can be 
 
111 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 629 (1987)(describing the incentive effects of the default rule of expectation 
damages). 
112 See generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 
YALE. L. J. 52 (1936). 
113 See, e.g., Henry Cox, Specific Performance of Contracts to Sell Land, 16 KY. L. J. 338, 338 
(1927) (“Whatever the explanation may be, it is generally undisputed that where land or any 
interest land is the subject matter of an agreement, equity has jurisdiction to enforce specific 
performance, and it does not depend on the inadequacy of the legal remedy in the particular 
case.”) 
114 Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Fixing Unfair Contracts, 63 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2011) (analyzing court 
approaches to addressing unenforceable terms). 
115 For a traditional analysis of the meaning of reformation in contracts, see George E. Palmer, 
The Effect of Misunderstanding on Contract Formation and Reformation Under the Restatement of Contracts 
Second, 65 MICH. L. REV. 33 (1966) (describing the option of reforming—i.e., judicially fixing—
contracts that are based on misunderstanding). 
116 See, e.g., Edward S. Thurston, Recent Developments in Restitution: Rescission and Reformation for 
Mistake, Including Misrepresentation, 46 MICH. L. REV. 1037 (1948). 
117 See, e.g., Samuel A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEG. 
STUD. 147 (1984). 
118 See, e.g., Charles Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation 
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 
(1977). 
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excised from the contract without destroying the rest of the obligations.119 Courts then choose 
how to fill the gap left by the severed term: a “reasonable” gap-filler, a punitive term, or a 
solution that is “minimally tolerable”120 These solutions aim largely to reform the deal, to move 
the parties from an unacceptable deal to a deal that is both viable in court and approximating a 
deal that would be acceptable to similarly situated parties.121 
 
A majoritarian approach, constrained by doctrinal accounts of fairness, sounds eminently 
reasonable on its face, but the experimental research from psychology, including the study 
reported here, gives us reason for concern about a reformative approach. Reformation removes 
bad terms as quietly as possible, and that quiet helps sustain an overall impression that 
consumer contracts are functionally law. The reformation preserves the status quo largely 
through its perverse incentives for firms. When the only cost to a company for including a bad 
term is that the term will be cleanly removed by a court and replaced with something slightly-
less-firm-favoring, the expected value of the term is positive.122 Sometimes people will do what 
the term says without challenging it123, sometimes a court will strike it down124—at worst, it’s a 
little bit useful as leverage outside the courts125; at best, it heads off complaints before they even 
make it to the customer service agent.126  
 
119 See, e.g., Mark L. Movesesian, Severability in Statutes and Contracts, 30 GA. L. REV. 47-48 (1995) 
(“A court will sever an illegal term and enforce the remainder of an otherwise valid contract, 
but only where the illegal term ‘is not an essential part of the agreed exchange’. Whether a given 
provision is an essential part of the agreed exchange turns on the intent of the parties to the 
contract.”) 
120 See, e,g., Ben-Shahar, supra note 113 (“Drafting a contract that contains terms other than the 
most reasonable ones is not illegal nor is it uncommon. It is only when these advantages are 
excessive—when they reach beyond a level that is regarded as tolerable—that the law steps in 
to invalidate them. Thus, if a court is to reform the unfair contract, it is only the illegitimate 
element of the one-sided term that needs to be struck. Effectively, then, the court would fill 
the gap with a term that is still one-sided, still favorable to the same party who dictated the 
original excessive term, but moderated sufficiently so that it would be tolerated.”) 
121 Id. at 452. 
122 See, e.g., Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q. J. ECON. 121 (1984) 
(formally modeling expected value of contracts terms under conditions of traditional remedies 
for breach).  
123 See, e.g., Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3 at 164 (summarizing the results of an experimental 
study showing that contract policies were more likely to go unchallenged than identical policies 
in a non-contract form). 
124 See, e.g., Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability Doctrine, 
Usury Laws, and Related Limitations on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 283 (1995).  
125  See, e.g., Dennis Stolle & Andrew Slain, Standard Form Contracts and Contract Schemas: A 
Preliminary Investigation of Exculpatory Clauses on Consumers’ Propensity to Sue, 15 BEH. SCI. & L. 83 
(1997) (reporting a study that a sample of readers who saw a gym contract with an 
unenforceably broad limitation on liability for the gym reported that they would be less likely 
to sue in the event of injury than if the clause were not present). 
126 Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 3 at 164. 
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Further, the more unenforceable terms exist, the more normal they seem.127 One of the key 
findings in David Hoffman’s 2016 influential article on age and contracting was that younger 
subjects, those who grew up with the internet, were more likely to be “formalists on steroids”128. 
His experiments suggested that those who were more familiar with contracts via online 
contracting were less likely to predict that terms could be unenforceable on the basis of 
unconscionability; and he surmised that “millennials indeed naively believe that contract law 
does not account for fairness or moral norms, but is instead a bit of a game.”129 The argument 
here is that the terms that you see shape what you think contract law is. To the extent that 
boilerplate looks impregnable, it will feed the very justificatory phenomenon I have described 
experimentally—it will retain the sense that it is foundational and unremarkable rather than the 
unstable results of in-house counsel adding terms prophylactically over time.  
 
b. Disruption 
 
When consumers are over-deferential to terms, we ought to worry about a counterproductive 
inhibition to challenge and debate. When unenforceable terms may be voided by a court, but 
firms are not otherwise penalized, those terms will persist.130 By contrast, courts and legislatures 
have a robust toolkit of remedial approaches that might be productively disruptive. We can 
think of different ways of approaching bad terms as existing on a continuum very 
accommodating to very disruptive. Accommodation here refers to the way that the court 
accommodates the contract and the parties, identifying a solution that tries to repair and 
smooth. A very accommodating approach might be severability plus a term that is basically 
firm-favorable. A very disruptive approach, on the other hand, might be a public FTC action 
with monetary penalties for any unfair practices.131 This is disruptive in the sense that it creates 
a noisy remedy and potentially destroys salvageable pieces of the parties’ deal. And, of course, 
there are a series of potential approaches in between, some of which are highlighted below. 
 
1. Refusal to Sever Bad Terms 
 
Although some of the most famous cases of unconscionable terms in contract go to the core 
of the deal, most of the terms I have described in this Article are part of the boilerplate—these 
are terms about arbitration, or limitations on liability, or class action waivers. In such cases, it 
is the default approach of courts faced with an unenforceable term to excise that term and 
 
127 See generally Hoffman supra note 45. 
128 Hoffman, supra note 32 at 1622. 
129 Id at 1627. 
130 See, e.g., Meirav Furth-Matzkin, On The Unexpected Use of Unenforceable Contract Terms: Evidence 
from the Residential Rental Market, 9.1 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 1 (2017). 
131 See Greg Dickenson, Survey of Recent FTC Privacy Enforcement Actions and Developments, 70 
BUSINESS LAWYER 247, 250 (2015) (reviewing FTC enforcement actions). 
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interpret the remainder of the contract. And in the case of mass market forms, severability will 
often be an explicit term, instructing the court that any single unenforceable term should not 
affect the enforceability of the contract as a whole. This approach, described above as a species 
of reformation, is both quite firm-favorable and highly non-salient to the ordinary consumer. 
Refusal to sever is just the opposite; it offers a noisy, disruptive remedy that is aversive enough 
to the firm that it is likely to change firm drafting practices. 
 
We can look to an example from Philadelphia’s housing code for a good proof of concept. The 
city of Philadelphia recently implemented a new regulation: in order for a landlord to begin 
eviction proceedings or otherwise bring a claim against a tenant, the landlord would need to 
show a lease in compliance with local regulations.132 Lease terms are notoriously rife with 
unenforceable terms, with landlords claiming no liability for dangerous conditions, for 
example.133 The landlords who want to be able to leverage a lease, therefore, have an incentive 
to bring it into compliance. This type of remedy restructures the incentives for the drafters, 
introducing a positive probability of financial losses if bad terms come to light—if you want to 
include unenforceable terms, you risk the possibility that the court will deem the entire 
instrument unenforceable. 
 
2. Civil Fines 
 
An even more explicit reordering of incentives—imposing fines—is the mechanism some state 
statutes rely on for deterring aggressive actions against consumers. One way to penalize, and 
thus deter, the inclusion of unenforceable terms is for courts to impose direct financial costs 
when courts see bad terms. California’s “Yelp law” statutes operate in this way.134 The state of 
California has outlawed anti-disparagement clauses that would prevent consumers from 
complaining online about negative experiences with firms, doctors, restaurants, or other 
sellers.135 Firms who include such terms, and try to enforce them, are subject to a civil penalty.136 
These kinds of mechanisms can shift the incentives for firms to promulgate contracts that are, 
at the least, in line with existing legal rules.137 Indeed, even civil fines for firms with bad terms 
 
132 See Jake Blumgart, Philadelphia Renters Just Scored a Courtroom Win, WHYY.com, January 25, 
2018 (“Under the new rule, if a landlord is seeking back rent or eviction, and they can’t show a 
certificate of rental suitability for the entire period attached to the complaint, the court will not 
enter a default judgment or judgment by agreement.”) 
133 See, e.g., Furth-Matzkin, supra note 130 at 4. 
134 See generally Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. 
TELECOMM. &  TECH. L. REV. 1 (2017) (describing the genesis and impact of California’s 
legislative effort to ban anti-disparagement clauses). 
135 Id. at 2 (arguing that the ability to lodge public complaints facilitates an efficient market).  
136 See, e.g., Wayne Barnes, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Online Reviews: The Trouble with Trolls 
and a Role for Contract Law After the Consumer Review Fairness Act, 53 GA. L. REV. 549 (2018). 
137 See Ben-Shahar, supra note 120 at 120 (outlining a conceptual framework for understanding 
the incentive effects of judicial responses to bad terms). 
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could in fact be pushed further by creating a private cause of action. California’s anti-
disparagement remedy does not kick in until the firm tries to bring a legal action, meaning that 
it offers essentially a defense for the consumer. In the same way that consumers can bring 
complaints under federal and state Unfair and Deceptive Practices statutes for misleading 
statements of fact138, legislatures could authorize a private right of action for firms that purport 
to require impermissible promises from their consumers. Such a move would, among other 
benefits, incentivize a crowdsourced hunt for unenforceable terms by consumers, and thus 
dramatically increase the probability of detection. 
 
3. Public Actions 
 
Finally, and perhaps most disruptively, the CFPB and the FTC could bring public actions 
against firms promulgating unenforceable deals. This is, of course, a core part of the 
enforcement power of both agencies, and indeed their current actions feature some of the same 
core analytic claims.  Both the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade 
Commission are authorized to file claims in federal court or to initiate administrative 
proceedings against a company charged with consumer violations.139 Such actions are not 
unusual, even in administrations with more conservative consumer protection goals. For 
example: in 2018, the CFPB required CitiBank to pay 335 million in restitution to credit card 
holders who paid more in APR than they should have been required to pay.140 In 2019 the FTC 
settled with AT&T to enjoin the wireless company from promising “unlimited data” but not 
specifying data speeds, which were reduced with high use.141 And in 2020, the CFPB sued Think 
Finance for collecting debts against tribal borrowers for loan terms that were impermissible 
under state law.142 In each of these cases, we can characterize the agency action as essentially a 
response to a bad term. If, however, we were interested in a creating more robust challenges to 
consumer contracts, we might want to suggest that agencies should have the ability to bring 
actions against firms with unenforceable terms even when the terms have not caused concretel 
 
138 See, e.g., Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under Deceptive Trade Practices Acts: Reconsidering the FTC Act 
as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. J. 437, 437 (1991) (“Most states—in an effort further to discourage 
inappropriate trade practices and to compensate injured consumers—have extended to private 
consumers the right to sue for deceptive and, in some states, unfair trade practices.”) 
139  See, e.g., Adam Levitin, The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. 
BANKING & FIN. L. 321, 344-358 (2013) (taxonomizing agency powers over consumer 
protection actions).  
140  In the Matter of Citibank, N.A. (2018) available at 
files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_citibank-na_consent-order_2018-06.pdf 
141  Federal Trade Commission vs.  AT&T Mobility LLC (2019) available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/doc_190_2019-11-
05_proposed_stipulated_final_order.pdf 
142  CFPB vs. ThinkFinance, LLC U.S.D.Mt. (2020) available at 
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_think-finance_stipulated-final-
consent-order_2020-02.pdf 
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losses to consumers. Unenforceable class action waivers, for example, may not in themselves 
cause traceable financial losses to individual consumers, but may nonetheless be a target for 
FTC or CFPB actions.  
 
The argument here is that different enforcement mechanisms for policing unfair terms have 
differential effects on how consumers understand their legal world. When unenforceable terms 
are excised and smoothed over, contracts stay long and formal, and consumer law looks like a 
monolith. When they receive public approbation or private penalties, the contracts themselves 
change and the public perception may follow, in turn creating a more robust political and 
cultural conversation around how firms create legal obligations for consumers.  
 
C. Measuring Attitudes About Law 
 
Although the primary aim of this research involves a set of questions about contract law and 
behavior, these studies also raise some important methodological questions for legal and social 
science scholars who measure attitudes about law. For at least a half-decade, legal scholarship 
has embraced and internalized the assumptions, values, and language of economic theory.143 At 
the core of that embrace is the faith in self-interest, the belief that humans can, should, and will 
take steps to pursue their own goals, however broadly defined.144 Psychologists have long 
observed that people often appear to evince beliefs that are in direct tension with their own 
self-interest, or at least their apparent self-interest. 145  The explanation from psychologists 
essentially challenges the shallow notion of self-interest—what is in my interest is not just what 
would ultimately make me richer or happier, but also the choices that dignify the life I am living 
now.146 System justification theory, for example, argues that there are particular contexts in 
which motivated reasoning captures more than material self-interest. It captures instead a 
preference to perceive control or orderliness in the universe or, conversely, to avoid feeling 
chronically angry or depressed at an unfair world. 
 
 
 
143 See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract Remedies, 57 
U. COLO. L. REV. 683, 687 (1986); see also Alan Schwartz & Louis Wilde, Intervening in Markets 
on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 630 (1979). 
144 See, e.g., Jack Hirschleifer, The Expanding Domain of Economics, 75 AMER. ECON. REV. 53 (1985) 
(arguing that economic theory encompasses a wide scope of preferences and values more often 
associated with disciplines like moral philosophy).  
145 See, e.g., John T. Jost, Working Class Conservatism: A System Justification Perspective, 18 CURRENT 
OPINION PSYCH., 73–78 (2017) (describing the apparent paradox of low-income voters 
choosing political candidates who eschew redistributive policies). 
146 See, e.g., John T. Jost, Danielle Gaucher, and Chadly Stern, “The World Isn’t Fair”: A System 
Justification Perspective on Social Stratification and Inequality, in 2 APA HANDBOOK OF PERSONALITY 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 317–40 (M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver ed., 2015) (outlining the 
theory of system justification). 
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It is in this light that it might be worth revisiting the consent results here. The main inference 
we can reasonably draw from these results on consent is that contractual assent looks like “real” 
consent to most people. Consent ratings were consistently definitive and high. Contracts here 
may provide a window into a broader social and psychological phenomenon: the preference to 
see oneself as a subject and not an object. Roseanna Sommers, Vanessa Bohns, Meirav Furth 
and others have begun to write about consent across an array of contexts, including contracting 
but also around issues of medical decision-making, sexual contact, and privacy intrusions. 
Sommers, for example, asked a series of questions about whether or not various personal 
violations were consensual when they were procured by intentional deception. Is sex 
consensual when a partner claims to be unmarried but is not? Is an elective surgery consensual 
when the doctor lies about its cost? The remarkable finding of Sommers’s studies was subjects’ 
consistent resistance to judgments of non-consensuality. The only one of her many examples 
to get less than half (49.4%) of all subjects finding consent was deception about HIV status 
resulting in HIV transmission.147 
 
In research with Vanessa Bohns, Sommers plumbed the psychology of consent further.148 They 
asked subjects to come into the lab and randomly assigned them to one of two conditions: real 
request or hypothetical request. The request in each case was for the subjects’ phone. A research 
assistant asked either, “Could you unlock your phone so I can take it for a minute?” or “If I 
asked you to unlock your phone and let me take it for a minute, would you let me?” Subjects 
who got the hypothetical request essentially said no; a little more than a quarter of the subjects 
reported that they’d let the researcher look at their unlocked phone. Subjects in the real request 
condition handed their phones over essentially every time. The magnitude of the difference 
between the two conditions, in other words, was about 70 percentage points. No one thought 
they would consent to a privacy intrusion under the extraordinarily light pressure of an 
adolescent RA making a polite request; everyone consented. 
 
If the first of these consent findings is that subjects do not view consent as being meaningfully 
vitiated when its manifestation is elicited through trickery149, the second finding might be that 
they do not view themselves as people who would likely manifest consent lightly.150 We can 
think of this as separate phenomena, as I did in a 2014 paper: there is a preference to think of 
oneself as careful, or savvy, or discerning (I would not risk a bad outcome by consenting)151; 
and then there is a preference to think of the world as orderly and just (This bad outcome is 
 
147 Roseanna Sommers, Commonsense Consent, YALE L. J. (forthcoming 2020). 
148 Roseanna Sommers & Vanessa K. Bohns, The Voluntariness of Voluntary Consent: Consent 
Searches and the Psychology of Compliance, 128 YALE L.J. 1792 (2019). 
149 Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Consent and the Problem of Fine Print, 
STAN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).  
150 Sommers supra note 148; see also Wilkinson-Ryan supra note 88 at 214 (showing results of 
a study suggesting that people overestimate their own likelihood to read carefully before signing 
a contract and underestimate the difficulty of assenting with full knowledge). 
151 Id. 
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not evidence of malfeasance, it is the result of my choice to take a risk). In other words, these 
are species of overconfidence or overoptimism.152 But scholars might do well to think of these 
as part of an integrated and specific phenomenon—a belief that consent is special.153 Indeed, 
we might think about consent as a means of facilitating system justification more generally—if 
I agreed to it, it is not, by definition, out of my control or morally wrong. I cannot be a victim 
if the outcome was my choice. 
 
In much of economics, rational actor models are employed to describe consumption patterns, 
but it is not unusual to consider arguably non-consumptive choices in terms of rationality. For 
example: is it rational to vote?154 Is it rational to commit a violent felony?155 Is it rational to get 
married?156 It will not escape the reader’s notice that these choices are all questions with real 
legal ramifications. When decision-making implicates a broad set of moral, social, and legal 
norms, as well as more immediate visceral and financial well-being, evaluating rationality per se 
is naturally more fraught. These studies measured attitudes toward a series of legal constructs—
contracts, contract rules, and parties—much like the consent research described above. The 
insight from the research here is that the attitudes that subjects reported were a) malleable and 
b) motivated in ways that would not be obvious. Measuring attitudes about legal rules or legal 
constructs is a distinctive task in at least two ways. The first is that legal decision-making always 
involves anticipating what an authority believes about your choice. The second is that legal 
decision-making is situated within the context of a society. That is, it naturally implicates social 
and moral values—what we owe each other. These are fundamentally social beliefs, and 
therefore fall within the natural parameters of social psychology. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In the past decade, psychological and behavioral studies have found that individual 
commitment to contracts persists beyond personal relationships and traditional promises. Even 
take-it-or-leave it consumer contracts get substantial deference from consumers—even when 
 
152 Id. at 210 (reporting a study of the relationship between overconfidence in one’s own 
readership and blame for non-reading consumers).  
153 See, e.g., Sommers, supra note 141 (describing the unique role of consent in judgments of 
moral harm and moral blame). 
154 See, e.g., Aaron Edlin, Andrew Gelman & N. Kaplan, Why and How People Vote to Improve the 
Well-Being of Others, RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY (2007) (arguing that voting is rational when 
people have other-regarding preferences). 
155 See, e.g., Irving Piliavin, Rosemary Gartner, Craig Thornton, and Ross L. Matsueda. Crime, 
Deterrence, and Rational Choice, 45 AMER. SOC. REV. 101 (1986) (specifying the economic model 
for crime deterrence under a rational actor theory).  
156 See, e.g., Elizabeth Scott, Rational Decision-Making about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9 
(1990) (describing family law and family behavior in light of rational bargaining models). 
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the terms are unenforceable157, even when the assent is procedurally compromised158, and even 
when the drafter is an impersonal commercial actor.159 It is puzzling to find that the very 
population most likely to be subject to unfair provisions or harsh contractual penalties is 
relentlessly sanguine about their apparent vulnerability. In some sense, the explanation offered 
here is the simplest—people accept their deals, defer to their terms, because it feels better than 
the alternative. Legal rules and fine print are implacable parts of our landscape. These studies 
suggest that some term deference is motivated by an underlying drive to make peace with the 
status quo, especially when the status quo is seems firmly rooted. The results here have 
implications not only for contract law, but also for how we understand self-interest in legal 
decision-making, and for the legal understandings of consent and compliance. 
 
157 Furth-Matzkin & Sommers, supra note 149. 
158 Wilkinson-Ryan supra note 3. 
159 Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales, supra note 62. 
